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   The above  is a call to reconsider the role of Israel in the Eastern Front in the Cold War in  
the Mediterranean in the light of the evidence offered by the  U.S. Defense Department 痴 
evaluation of Israel/Palestine in 1948. 
  In the years immediately following World War ll, Washington regarded the Eastern  
Mediterranean as a double mirror,  reflecting its Levantine politics with the mix of related  
defense and commercial interests on one side, and the protection of its  Eastern Arab oil  
interests, on the other.  After May 1948, Israel was to play a role in both dimensions of US  
Mediterranean policy which,  in practice, constituted an inseparable whole.
  While the impact of  the U.S. President痴 recognition of Israel in May 1948  has long been  
the object of critical examination, the same cannot be said of the Defense Department 痴 
position in the aftermath of Israel痴 independence. Again, far more familiar are the views of  
Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal who-among others in the State as well as Defense  
Departments and CIA,  prior to May 1948, were openly apprehensive of developments that  
risked endangering US oil and commercial interests in the Arab world. On the other hand,  
prior to May 1948,  it was assumed that the numerical superiority of the surrounding Arab  
states would nullify the prospects of  a Jewish victory. This changed with the Jewish  
forcesacquisition of illegal arms from Czechoslovakia such that from mid-May 1948, the IDF  
The Cold War in the Mediterranean Project
The European Institute, Columbia University
DRAFT Working Paper
Do not cite or quote without author's permission
12
emerged in a superior position with respect to men and arms inspite of Arab reinforcements.  
1 *
  The results radically altered the social and political landscape of Palestine and the Middle  
East, as well as the outlook and calculations of the U.S. State and Defense Departments.  
Less than a year after Israel痴 declaration of independence on May 15, 1948, US officials  
came to appreciate Israel痴 military potential initiating a relationship that would reach iconic  
levels after 1967. But it was nearly twenty years earlier, in the aftermath of the struggle over  
Palestine in 1948, that the US Defense Department recognized the potential of  such  
developments in terms of US interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East.
 
 Such recognition had  other consequences, however, no less ignored in conventional  
accounts of U.S. postwar policy.  The Defense Department 痴 reevaluation of Israeli potential 
occurred in the same period in which US Consular officials in Palestine/ Israel and US  
diplomats in Lebanon were sending the State Department evidence of  Jewish atrocities and  
expulsions of Palestinians, as in Deir Yassin, Haifa and Jaffa,  while State Department and  
National Security Council officials in Washington moved within increasingly narrow margins  
to accommodate Israeli痴 territorial expansion while seeking accommodation on this and the  
question of Palestinian refugees.
      It was Thomas  C. Wasson, US Consul General in Jerusalem  who was assassinated on  
May 23, who on April 13, 1948, sent Secretary of State Marshall a confidential report on what  
had transpired in the village of Deir Yassin, a Palestinian village lying west of Jerusalem  
where 殿 ttackers killed 250 persons of whom half, by their own admission to American  
1 Avi Shlaim, 的 srael and the Arab Coalition in 1948,in Avi Shlaim and Eugene L Rogan, eds., The War for 
Palestine, 2001, pp.80.
* The documentation included in this essay is drawn from my forthcoming study, 泥 ying to Forget: The 
Foundations of US Foreign Policy in the Middle East , Oil, Palestine/Israel, 1945-1949,to be published by 
Columbia University Press.
2
correspondents, were women and children. Attack carried out in connection battle now still in  
progress between Arabs and Jews on roads leading to Jerusalem from Tel Aviv. 2After this, 
Wasson reported, changes of a cease fire and truce would be remote. On April 24,  Marshall  
received a cable concerning alarming developments in Haifa,  whose oil refinery  had been  
the scene of past struggles, and was now in the hands of Jewish forces. 3  On June 23, the 
US Consul in Haifa, Aubrey Lippincott reported to Marshall that he had learned of the  
screening procedures to which Arabs resident in Haifa were being subjected by Jewish  
authorities. 鄭 rabs who return Haifa are considered illegals. These also required take oath  
allegiance Jewish state. Result is remaining Arabs determined leave. 4  It was only in April 
1949 that the US Minister to Lebanon, Lowell C Pinkerton, submitted the documents that he  
had received from the Executive Committee of the Jaffa and District Inhabitants Council who  
represented Jaffa, Ramley and Lydda and the Arab villages that formed part of the district.  
Pinkerton痴 report consisted of the documentation relevant to the expulsion of Palestinians  
from the above areas.
   Reports from Deir Yassin, Haifa and Jaffa and innumerable other Arab villages and towns  
are an integral part of the US record that has long been ignored in US accounts of Israel 痴 
state formation. The same may be said of the landmark  studies by  contemporary Israeli  
scholars such as Benny Morris and Ilan Pappe , and the far less complete and far earlier  
account by Simha Flapan  among others.  
2 April 13, 1948, The Consul at Jerusalem (Wasson) to the Secretary of State, FRUS 1948, Vol. V, part 2, 
p.817.
3 See Simha Flapan, The Birth of Israel,  Pantheon Books, N.Y. 1987,  p. 89; Major R.D. Wilson, 典 he Battle 
for Haifa, April 21-22, 1948,in Walid Khalidi, ed., From Haven to Conquest, Beirut, 1971, pp. 771-774; Walid 
Khalidi, 鉄 pecial Feature, The Fall of Haifa Revisited,Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. XXXVll, no.3, Spring 
2008, pp.30-58
4 June 23, 1948, The Consul at Haifa (Lippincott) to the Secretary of State, FRUS 1948, V, part 2, p. 1138.
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   It is the US material that is relevant to this essay since some of those who fully recognized  
the consequences of what they were reporting to Washington in 1948, were among those  
prepared to 僧 ove onin the aftermath of the independence struggle.  And one may assume  
that while those who reported such evidence were few, the implications of what they had  
found was known to the larger US diplomatic community, let alone those in Washington  
concerned with developments in Palestine. 
     Ten days before Britain痴 exit from Palestine, US officials in Palestine faced the Jewish  
Agency痴 rejection of a truce or indeed, a trusteeship arrangement to replace what the State  
Department and the White House conceded to be the failure of the partition plan. In  
evaluating the situation, Special Assistant to Dean Rusk, Robert McClintock, deliberated over  
the implications of these developments. It may well be, he speculated, that Washington  
would soon be confronted with a situation created by Jewish military forces, including the  
Haganah and the Stern gang and Irgun, in which it would have to determine whether 笛
ewish armed attack on Arab communities in Palestine is legitimate or whether it constitutes  
such a threat to international peace and security as to call for coercive measures by the  
Security Council.5 Washington would face what McClintock called an 殿 nomalous situationin 
which 鍍 he Jews will be the actual aggressors against the Arabs. However,  the Jews will  
claim that they are merely defending the boundaries of a state which were traced by the UN  
and approved, at least in principle, by two thirds of the UN membership.”
     Within two weeks of Israel痴 declaration of independence, the Policy Planning Staff 殿
greed that we should begin immediately to develop a paper on Palestine and its overall  
policy implications, particularly with respect to the Middle East, for submission to the  
5 May 4, 1948, Draft Memorandum by the Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs (Rusk) to the Under 
Secretary of State (Lovett), FRUS 1948, V, part 2, p.894. While this memo was drafter by McClintock, it 
appears that it was not sent.
4
Secretary [of State] and Mr Lovett and eventual clearance through the National Security  
Council,recently formed.6  Mc Clintock was on the PPS staff, as was Philip Jessup, then 
Acting Representative of the U.S. at the UN. 
    As McClintock made clear, Washington not only recognized the Provisional Government of  
Israel, it would not move to challenge its sovereignty or undermine its control of territory  
beyond the UN痴 designated boundaries, as in UN Res. 181.
Loy Henderson of the State Department reinforced the same position, making it clear that  
any territorial changes which the US might recommend to Israel would have to have Israeli  
approval.
 
  In late June 1948 McClintock  reviewed what had transpired since the UN Partition  
Resolution of 1947 and concluded that 鍍 here will be no separate Arab State and no 
economic union as envisaged in the General Assembly resolution. 7 The situation facing the 
parties to the conflict, and the U.S., were new and McClintock was now prepared to consider  
the 粗 xchangeor 奏 ransferof populations, a reference to the organized expulsion of  
Palestinians. 8 The purpose of such a policy, according to McClintock, was the creation of an  
environment in which :the State of Israel would contain most of the Jews of Palestine and the  
Arabs would reside in purely Arab areas.9 
     
        Nearly two months after Israel痴 emergence as an independent state, Philip Jessup,  
another PPS member, who was the Deputy U.S. Representative on the Security Council in  
6 June 2, 1948, Minutes of the Policy Planning Staff, FRUS 1948, V, part 2, p. 1088.
7 June 23, 1948, Memorandum by Mr Robert McClintock, FRUS 1948, V, part 2, p.1135.
8 See June 19, 1948, The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State, FRUS 
1948, V, part 2, p. 1124.
9 June 23, 1948, Memorandum by Mr Robert McClintock, FRUS 1948, V, part 2, p.1135.
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the summer of 1948,  was, as in the case of McClintock, reconsidering earlier UN resolutions  
and their references to an Arab state and finding it obsolete. It was time to think about  
Abdullah and the prospects of Transjordan.
     More generally, Jessup concluded that 妬 f fairly treated, [Israel] could become a force 
operating to our advantage and to advantage of Arab countries.” 10 The importance of such a 
development in Jessup痴 view becomes clear as one considers his perception of the place 
of Palestine in the context of US Middle East policy. 
        From the strategic viewpoint we assume that Palestine, together with  
the neighboring countries is a major factor presumably in any future major  
conflict this region would be of vital importance to US as a potential base  
area and with respect to our lines of communication. Presumably also the oil  
resources of the area are considered vital. It is our feeling that this last point  
may not perhaps have been dealt adequately and frankly enough in official  
and public discussion of the Palestine question.
        From the economic viewpoint it is probable that with the exception of oil  
our trade and other economic relations with Palestine and the other Near  
East countries are not directly of any substantial importance. Indirectly,  
however, the economic stability and developing prosperity of Palestine and  
the Middle East area under peaceful conditions could make a very  
substantial contribution to the economic recovery of the world generally and  
thus contribute to the economic welfare of the U.S. With respect to oil, we  
recognize that the oil supply from the area is of great importance in the  
European recovery program. Were it not for this factor, however, and the  
strategic importance of oil we should probably not allow the economic  
importance of this commodity to condition our judgment substantially  with  
regard to Palestine. [italics mine]11
   
     Was it the acknowledged importance of 鍍 his commoditythat permitted Jessup to convey 
Israel痴 denial of responsibility for Palestinian refugees to the Secretary of State at the end  
of July without contesting its claims?  The Director of the Office of UN Affairs at the time,  
Dean Rusk, along with the UN Mediator, Count Bernadotte, were among those who did  
contest such a position, albeit without effect.
10 July 1, 1948,  The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Jessup) to the Secretary of 
State, FRUS, 1948, V, part 2, p.1183.
11 Ibid., p.1181.
6
   Defense Department  officials concluded by 1949 that Israel was the second state after  
Turkey in terms of its military capacity and potential in US strategic planning for the region.  
Indeed, on March 7, 1949, a Memorandum by the Chief of Staff of the US Air Force to the  
Joint Chiefs of Staff on 填.S. Strategic Interests in Israel,concluded as follows:
       The power balance in the Near and Middle East has been radically  
altered. At the time the state of Israel was forming, numerous indications  
pointed to its extremely short life in the face of Arab League opposition.  
However, Israel has now been recognized by the United States and the  
United Kingdom, is likely soon to become a member of the United Nations,  
and has demonstrated by force of arms its right to be considered the military  
power next after Turkey in the Near and Middle East. 12
     
    According to the above source, 殿 s a result of its support to Israel, the United States 
might now gain strategic advantages from the new political situation.In that light, the Air  
Force Chief of Staff called for a study of 填 S strategic objectives touching Israel,in addition 
to recommending that military training and assistance be considered and that above all,  
Soviet influence in Israel be blocked.
   And indeed, several weeks later, on March 24, there was some discussion on precisely this  
possibility involving Israeli and Arab officers to be trained in the U.S. Support for such an  
option was based on the signing of armistice agreements between Israel, Egypt, Lebanon  
and the anticipated signing with Transjordan, which was interpreted as the end of hostilities.  
That Israel was interested in such a move was regarded as a sign of its  pro-western  
orientation, a matter of some concern to Washington given the persistent fear that the USSR  
had made inroads into Israel with its recognition of the state, in addition to the influx of 駑 igr
駸 from Eastern Europe. 
12 March7, 1949, Memorandum by the Chief of Staff,  US Air Force to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on US 
Strategic Interest in Israel, in Records of the JCS, Part 2, 1948-1953 [sect B], the Middle East, p.181. Film A 
368 [B] Reel 2.
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  In any case, the  recommendation with respect to military training was to send 登 fficer 
student training missions from Israel and the Arab states, in reasonable numbers, consistent  
with the ability of the various services to handle such missions.” 13 It should be emphasized 
that the US military had made it clear earlier that it would oppose the participation of US  
troops in 殿 UN peacekeeping force in Palestine, on the grounds that a considerable number  
of American troops might become bogged down in Palestine. 14
 This is no way precluded Washington from providing Israel with US technical assistance for  
the training of the US military,as discussed in April 1949, that is just over a year after Israel 痴 
creation.15  The Chief of Naval Operations considered the possibility of providing such  
assistance but delayed it until the risk of ensuing conflict had sufficiently abated so as not to  
implicate the US in the fighting. But above all, 殿 t the end of April 1949, the American 
CINCELM (Commander in Chief of US Naval Forces, East Atlantic and Mediterranean)  
pressed the JCS to allot the highest priority to ensuring Israel 痴 friendship.16  The concern 
was that Israel 塗 inder the construction of forward airfields on her territory, and the free  
movement of forces and equipment along their planned lines of communication. 17
   The May 16, 1949 report issued by the Secretary of Defense, the 鉄 tudy of United States 
Strategic Objectives in Israel,contained no references to Washington 痴 critical response to 
Israel痴 position on the Palestine refugee problem. It acknowledged that 鍍 he new State of 
Israel has close ties with the United States because of our large and influential Jewish  
13 March 24, 1949, Memorandum by the Secretary of State, Conversation with the President, FRUS, 1949, 
Vl, p.864.
14 Cohen, Op. Cit., p. 199.
15 27 April 1949, Memorandum by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on United 
States Strategic Interest in Israel. JCS 1684/30, p. 194.
16 Michael J Cohen, Op.Cit., p. 204.
17 Ibid., p.205.
8
minority”18 What concerned the US military was Israel痴 orientation in the light of its location.  
The May 16 study opened with the statement: 的 srael is surrounded by her defeated foes 
who are still unfriendly.”19 It recommended that 電 ifferences between the new Israeli state 
and the neighboring Arab states should be reconciled at least to the extent that Israel and the  
Arab states would act in concert to oppose Soviet aggression 20 Reviewing the strategic value 
of Israel痴 location, the report proceeded to appraise its overall potential in the defense of  
US interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East.
    First,  there was the question of location. 
   The direct land routes (road and raid) between Turkey and the Cairo-Suez  
area pass through Israeli territory. In addition, the main land routes from the  
Caspian area of the USSR and from Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia to Egypt  
and the Levant pass through or near Israel痴 territory, as do the pipelines 
from the Middle East oil areas to the Mediterranean. Israel controls the land  
approaches to the Cairo-Suez area from the east, the border between Israel  
and Egypt being about one hundred and fifty miles east of the Suez Canal. 21
    Second, there was the question of bases. Although the US military did not envision Israel  
as the location of a major base, there was reported to be a high grade if limited 都 ystem of 
well-developed airfields and air bases. In our hands, these air installations would be most  
useful in the interdiction of the lines of communication from the USSR to the Middle East oil  
resources with medium and short-range aircraft.22 
    Third was the  importance of Israel痴 indigenous military forces, which have had some 
battle experience,and which, as the Joint Chiefs contemplated, could be important to 兎 ither 
the Western Democracies or the USSR in any contest for control of the Eastern  
18 May 16, 1949,  Study of United Stated Strategic Objectives in Israel included in Memorandum 礎 y the
Secretary of Defense (Johnson) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers). FRUS 
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Mediterranean-Middle East area.”23  Hence, in the face of a Soviet attempt to 都 ecure or 
neutralize the oil facilities of the Middle East and to operate against the Cairo-Suez base  
area,Israel痴 position and its forces would be critical. 鉄 hould Israel ally herself with the 
Western Democracies in the event of war with the USSR, full advantage could be taken of  
defensive positions in that country and of Israel痴 forces for the defense of the Cairo-Suez 
area and for land operations to defend or to recapture the Middle East oil facilities. 24
  Such considerations were based on the  axiom that  the security of the Eastern  
Mediterranean and the Middle East is of critical importance to the future security of the  
United States,which, in turn, assumed the 都 tability of the Middle East, including assurance 
that the peoples of this area will not turn to the USSR and against the United States, is a vital  
element in United States security.”25 
   But, as suggested earlier,  Truman himself, as well as State Department and NSC officials  
were aware of the urgency of resolving territorial questions as well as the Palestinian refugee  
problem, both of which were aggravated by Israel 痴 expansion beyond the lines of the 1947 
UN Partition Plan.  In June, the US delegate on the Palestine Conciliation Commission  
(PCC), Mark Etheridge, who was to resign from the PCC, was sharply critical of Israel 痴 
rejection of the right of Palestinian refugees to return, and what he regarded as its failure to  
define the bases of co-existence of Palestinian Arabs and Jews in Israel.  Some within the  
Israeli Foreign Ministry, such as Elias Sasson, was no less critical of his government 痴 
conception of its relations with Arab states.26 Sasson did not make policy in Israel, neither did 




26 Cited in Avi Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan, Columbia University Press, N.Y., 1988, p. 474.
10
   In July 1949, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and African Affairs, George  
McGhee  sought to persuade  Israel of the urgency of recognizing 鍍 he principle of territorial 
compensation for areas held by Israel outside the 1947 Palestine Partition lines and the  
repatriation of a substantial number of Palestine refugees without reference to territorial  
acquisition,27in order to avert a change in US policy- or more accurately, a change in US  
attitude toward Israel. 
  In the fall of 1949, the National Security Council issued a report (NSC 47/7), in which it  
expressed concern with the risk of non-solution of the Palestinian refugee problem.  But in  
this instance the NSC did not focus exclusively on Israeli responsibility, it included Arab  
states as accepting the resettlement of Palestinian refugees within their own borders. The  
risk, as far as the NSC was concerned, was the same, that is it was the potential  
radicalization of the Arab world. 
   But all such risks aside, the NSC was well aware of the comparative advantages that Israel  
possessed, including with respect to its military establishment.  Consider the following  
assessment that appeared in the same NSC report:
     Israel痴 military establishment, although small, is a relatively modern and  
effective fighting machine which has proved itself adequate to resist the  
poorly equiped, ill-trained and badly led armies of the Arab League states in  
the course of recent hostilities and to occupy considerable territory beyond  
that awarded under the partition plan. It can be expected that the future  
effectiveness of the Israeli Army will increase with the implementation of  
current plans for training and reorganization. 28
        
 In the light of the above, it is hardly surprising that in the same period, Admiral Richard  
Connolly, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Naval forces in the Eastern Atlantic and  
27 July 19, 1949, Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and African Affairs 
(McGhee) to the Secretary of State, FRUS 1949, Vl, p. 1236.
28 Oct. 17, 1949, NSC, FRUS 1949, Op. Cit., p.1434.
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Mediterranean, envisioned the possibilities of coordinating strategic planning with Turkey,  
Egypt and Israel.29
   It was in May 1950 that Truman met with the head of the American Jewish Committee,  
Jacob Blaustein, who was also in charge of the oil company, Amoco.  While Blaustein  
discussed oil imports with the President, he also informed him that he had contacted  
Defense Secretary, Louis Johnson, 鍍 hat under the existing circumstances you are willing 
(as he knows) for arms for defense purposes to go to Israel from this country, and that  
Secretary Acheson agrees with this.30
   The visit of Jacob Blaustein is not the critical factor here. It is a reflection, however, of  
changes that deserve far greater recognition than they have received. 
  The conclusion implicit in the posture of the US Defense and State Departments after May  
1948 is what calls for reflection. Its cause was unmistakable,  namely,   Israel 痴 military 
victory; its consequences no less so, as they stemmed from the regional shift in the regional  
balance of power that was, in turn, directly relevant to US policy in the Eastern  
Mediterranean and Middle East. 
29 Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold 
War, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1992, p. 287.
30 May 10, 1950, Jacob Blaustein to Truman, Personal,  Harry S. Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. 
Truman, President痴 Secretary痴 File.
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